Brunobkr/llama.cpp_AlgMor24_github

1## Threat Model for resolve (module path resolution library)2 3### 1. Library Overview4 5- **Library Name:** resolve6- **Brief Description:** Implements Node.js `require.resolve()` algorithm for synchronous and asynchronous file path resolution. Used to locate modules and files in Node.js projects.7- **Key Public APIs/Functions:** `resolve.sync()` / `resolve/sync`, `resolve()` / `resolve/async`8 9### 2. Define Scope10 11This threat model focuses on the core path resolution algorithm, including filesystem interaction, option handling, and cache management.12 13### 3. Conceptual System Diagram14 15```16Caller Application → resolve(id, options) → Resolution Algorithm → File System17                           │18                           └→ Options Handling19                           └→ Cache System20```21 22**Trust Boundaries:**23- **Input module IDs:** May come from untrusted sources (user input, configuration)24- **Filesystem access:** The library interacts with the filesystem to resolve paths25- **Options:** Provided by the caller26- **Cache:** Used to improve performance, but could be a vector for tampering or information disclosure if not handled securely27 28### 4. Identify Assets29 30- **Integrity of resolution output:** Ensure correct and safe file path matching.31- **Confidentiality of configuration:** Prevent sensitive path information from being leaked.32- **Availability/performance for host application:** Prevent crashes or resource exhaustion.33- **Security of host application:** Prevent path traversal or unintended filesystem access.34- **Reputation of library:** Maintain trust by avoiding supply chain attacks and vulnerabilities[1][3][4].35 36### 5. Identify Threats37 38| Component / API / Interaction                       | S  | T  | R  | I  | D  | E  |39|-----------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|40| Public API Call (`resolve/async`, `resolve/sync`)   | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | –  |41| Filesystem Access                                   | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | –  |42| Options Handling                                    | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | –  |43| Cache System                                        | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | –  |44 45**Key Threats:**46- **Spoofing:** Malicious module IDs mimicking legitimate packages, or spoofing configuration options[1].47- **Tampering:** Caller-provided paths altering resolution order, or cache tampering leading to incorrect results[1][4].48- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages revealing filesystem structure or sensitive paths[1].49- **Denial of Service:** Recursive or excessive resolution exhausting filesystem handles or causing application crashes[1].50- **Path Traversal:** Malicious input allowing access to files outside the intended directory[4].51 52### 6. Mitigation/Countermeasures53 54| Threat Identified                          | Proposed Mitigation |55|--------------------------------------------|---------------------|56| Spoofing (malicious module IDs/config)     | Sanitize input IDs; validate against known patterns; restrict `basedir` to app-controlled paths[1][4]. |57| Tampering (path traversal, cache)          | Validate input IDs for directory escapes; secure cache reads/writes; restrict cache to trusted sources[1][4]. |58| Information Disclosure (error messages)    | Generic "not found" errors without internal paths; avoid exposing sensitive configuration in errors[1]. |59| Denial of Service (resource exhaustion)    | Limit recursive resolution depth; implement timeout; monitor for excessive filesystem operations[1]. |60 61### 7. Risk Ranking62 63- **High:** Path traversal via malicious IDs (if not properly mitigated)64- **Medium:** Cache tampering or spoofing (if cache is not secured)65- **Low:** Information disclosure in errors (if error handling is generic)66 67### 8. Next Steps & Review68 691. **Implement input sanitization for module IDs and configuration.**702. **Add resolution depth limiting and timeout.**713. **Audit cache handling for race conditions and tampering.**724. **Regularly review dependencies for vulnerabilities.**735. **Keep documentation and threat model up to date.**746. **Monitor for new threats as the ecosystem and library evolve[1][3].**75